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This is an attempt to think through the idea that human knowledge has no 
fundamental ground. It seemed best to present this gesture in fragments rather than 
argument. In the questioning pursuit of  absolute certainty, one ultimately finds the 
promise of  such certainty itself  to be what is most questionable and uncertain. With 
this newfound uncertainty, the ground falls away and an abyss opens up which makes 
one wonder if  and how we know anything at all. What is miraculous is that, despite 
this epistemic abyss, we nonetheless can and do know—just not in a firmly 
grounded, absolutely certain way. We rather seem to make recourse to 
“commonsensical” articles of  faith which make understanding possible for us as 
much as they limit us. Perhaps these brief  fragments are ultimately concerned with 
human knowledge and human finitude, as they are an attempt to humble aspirations 
toward certain, grounded knowledge in one regard, yet they hopefully gesture toward 
what may actually be possible for human knowledge in another. 
§ 
At the bottom of  every system of  knowledge lies not a solid foundation, self-evidently true, but 
mere articles of  faith. “Self-evident truth” is synonymous with “irreducible article of  faith.” These 
articles of  faith ground some system of  knowledge; but, being groundless, they also betray the shaky 
foundations thereof. Upon this realization we may ask: “What grounds the ground of  this system of  
knowledge, if  its initial grounds prove to be mere articles of  faith without sufficient grounding?” 
“Why, the ground which grounds the ground!” “But what grounds the ground which grounds the 
ground?” “The ground which grounds the ground which grounds the ground!” and so on ad 
infinitum, ad absurdum. 
§ 
The infinite is an abyss –– The infinite regress which “opens up” when one plumbs the depths of  the 
ground of  some foundational system of  knowledge does indeed leave us with a foundation of  a 
sort: not a firm footing, but an abyss—for infinite regress is itself  an abyss. 
 
§  
At the foundation of  every system of  knowledge yawns an abyss. 
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§  
How are we to understand this abyss? It would seem foolish to avert our eyes from this disquieting 
spectacle. Has this newfound nothingness below our feet a positive or negative content? Have we 
simply led ourselves astray by relying too heavily on a foundationalist metaphor of  knowledge, 
seeking a sufficient ground when there never was one to begin with? Have we stumbled upon a 
truth? Have we already gone astray? Perhaps the actual foundation of  things is this abyss …? 
 
§  
An abyss emerges because we expected something at bottom which is not, cannot, and never has been there. 
§  
Absence has presence –– The experience of  nothingness itself  has positive content when it is felt as an 
absence, an unmet expectation felt as a lack. Without any prior expectation, nothingness is pure 
absence, and perhaps goes unfelt, for in this case one does not even know what one is missing. 
 
§  
Fundamental principles or self-evident truths (i.e., irreducible articles of  faith, beliefs) appear to ground 
themselves by way of  a bastardized circular logic (causa sui), curiously capable of  begetting entire 
systems of  knowledge, working as tacit beliefs about the world which make action (including 
thought) possible for us.  This self-causing power of  certain beliefs, however, says nothing about 1
their claim to certainty, especially as solid foundations for systems of  knowledge. 
 
§ 
Beliefs are not actively held, but rather subsist passively and unconsciously. Certainty is little more 
than the belief that something is certain. Likewise, the apparent solidity of  foundations comes from 
the belief  that such foundations are so. Beliefs themselves are first taken to be certain in some 
regard. Then, certain beliefs, “solid” to whom they are believed to be certain, become unconsciously, 
passively accepted by the believer as knowledge without further question.  
 
                                                                             §  
Doubt is thus an unconscious belief  loosened from its passive, believed certainty, either by way of  
 1. Such tacit beliefs may be called “common sense.”
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recalcitrant experiences or other disturbing events which confront said belief  by “falsifying” it and 
bringing it to light as something questionable.  
 
§  
Though beliefs may cause and uphold themselves, this does not necessarily make them trustworthy 
or “sufficiently grounded”; in fact, this propensity to self-ground and its unavoidably circular logic is 
what makes belief  most dubious and, in effect, groundless—in fact, it marks yet another opening of  
the abyss, for a firm ground remains out of  reach. 
§  
Can we concede the idea that such “self-evident truths”, these irreducible articles of  faith which we 
find at bottom, conceived as beliefs, are self-caused? The idea that foundations are self-caused is no 
less disquieting than the notion of  an abyssal infinite regress, for neither option provides us a firm 
footing. But it appears that one can (almost arbitrarily, though this would risk painting with too broad 
a stroke) posit any belief  in some system of  knowledge as being self-caused, as upholding itself, 
merely by asserting it and thus, in a crude manner, making it so. Yet this only seems to work so long as 
we do not bring the belief ’s sufficient grounding into question, burying our heads in the sand and 
asserting dogmatically what we have no right to claim. Here, finding causa sui itself  suspicious and 
insufficient for our task at hand, we are thus left with our abyssal ground as before without getting 
any closer to its meaning. 
§ 
We may attempt to “cross” this abyss by positing first principles, by consciously believing in some 
fundamental, irreducible articles of  faith upon which we may plant our feet. However, this active 
attempt to find one’s footing by way of  belief  is troubled by the fact that one loses one’s footing 
when discovering the groundlessness of  belief  as such, especially the groundlessness of  those 
beliefs which lie as some foundation. Every belief  has the capacity to “cause” itself, yet this does not 
give it any sufficient grounding. The stubborn assertion of  some belief  only stubbornly asserts some 
belief; questions regarding the belief ’s truth, certainty, and the like remain unaltered therein. 
 
                                                                             §  
Once the abyss yawns, a stubborn assertion of  belief  will not sufficiently cover it, for it is due to the 
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very fact that the foundation is composed of  groundless beliefs which opened the abyss from the 
start! And is there such a thing as a sufficiently grounded belief…? 
 
§  
We appear to remain ensnared in the nothingness which emerged at the outset. Yet, as Hume says, 
“An absurd consequence, if  necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd”—with this yawning 
abyss we have arrived at an absurd consequence, for an abyss is almost inconceivable (horror vacui), 
regardless of  its truth or illusoriness; but from what original doctrine did it emerge?  2
§ 
The need for and the very possibility of something like “sufficient grounding” as a foundation should be 
scrutinized, for we have hitherto assumed the notion “sufficient grounding” as self-evident and 
necessary for knowledge without bringing out what is questionable in it.  
 
§  
Implicit in the notion “sufficient grounding” is a need for fixity—the belief  in a belief ’s certainty, (or 
at least a belief  in the possibility  of  such certain beliefs which we can ground and fix ourselves). The 
emergent nothingness with which we are dealing is a consequence of  the absence of  such sufficient 
grounding, or rather the illusoriness of  fixity 
 
§  
Abandonment of  the need for fixity—Foundations, grounds, Being, and the like are attempts to escape 
the uncertainty and precariousness of  the ceaseless flux of  existence, to fix ourselves where we are 
in fact without stable ground. Perhaps the abyss which yawns at the bottom of  foundational systems 
of  knowledge shows us the nothingness of  this fixity sought. For, despite the extreme consequence 
of  this abyss, the world still exists and we are still in it, feeling, breathing, living; rather than reality 
itself  being abyssal, the abstract inventions of  fixity show themselves to be without reality, at bottom 
abyssal. To take the former as the conclusion would be to (wrongly) prioritize epistemology as 
accounting for all of  existence, and to thus assume that epistemology’s conclusions must directly 
speak to existence in toto, rather than only of  epistemology itself.  
 2. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hackett), 67
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§  
Faith is an attempt to attain fixity, but the abyss which emerges from this attempt shows the limits 
and insufficiency of  such attempts to attain fixity. While faith may be expedient, insofar as such 
attempts help make inquiry and action possible, there remains something chimerical about such 
“grounding” principles insofar as any actual fixity remains out of  reach.  
§ 
Founding principles, irreducible articles of  faith, thus work as heuristic devices (rather than certain, self-
evident axioms) which help us to “know” and act in the world, and which are arrived at and posited 
post hoc rather than the discovered at bottom or thought a priori. 
§ 
Of  course, these very fragments are predicated upon implicit, groundless beliefs. We are unable to 
fully uncover the operative beliefs at work here, even if  we attempt to enumerate them, for the very 
process of  enumeration involves further groundless, irreducible articles of  faith which remain 
implicit and undisclosed in order to enumerate––we need them to proceed in any mode of  discourse, 
action, or thought.  
 
§  
Further, such beliefs are born through our precarious experiences in the world. Thus, as heuristic 
devices, they help us more readily think and act without having to derive fundamental principles at 
every waking moment. However, precarious experience is not so much a ground for these beliefs as it 
is the ever-flowing canal from which they originate, itself  always already becoming, approaching us 
and streaming past us, capable of  knocking us off  our feet at any moment 
 
§  
Irreducible articles of  faith are not reducible to further grounding articles of  faith, but are enmeshed 
in a web of  other irreducible articles of  faith. When some come to light, others remain hidden in the 
background. Such faith produces commonsensical knowledge, which is as necessary as it is 
groundless. 
                                                                             §  
We are ultimately beholden to our self-evident truths, our irreducible articles of  faith, our beliefs, 
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our illusions, our myths, our knowledge, our fundamental principles, our axioms, our theories, our 
customs, our hopes … We are beholden to them insofar as they make the conditions of  life both 
possible and endurable for us; we are prey to them insofar as, on a whim, they may mislead us, 
disappoint us, break us. 
 
§ 
We have only the dubious certainty of  our feet. 
Ex Animo 8 Vol. 1
